CWM's Network of Theological Enquiry

Globalisation: A Myth Without a Vision?

Julio de Santa Ana

There are clear links between historical changes and the language used by human beings. As new realities emerge over time, new words and new turns of phrase come into use. Some terms fall into disuse, while others become common. The word "engineering", for example, and the words derived from it, were practically never used in everyday language before the middle of the 18th century. The wider use of the word coincides with the age of the industrial revolution.

Similarly, the word "international" came into current use in the late 17th or early 18th century, the period in modern history when national entities were being consolidated. During the 19th century, social struggles began to be conceived of in international terms and the notion of "international solidarity" was born. We may remember also, to give another example, that Karl Marx conceived of the market as an international phenomenon.

The term "globalisation" became current in modern languages from the 1960s on. McLuhan compared the situation created by the new information technologies to that of a "global village". Thereafter, others took up the "global" idea with reference to political, economic, cultural phenomena. In this paper, "globalisation" will be used principally in the economic sense.

This immediately raises an important problem: "globalisation" is not a univocal term, but a polysemic one that can be used in different senses, each indicating a different aspect of "globalisation". (This is why I prefer the French term "mondialisation" or the Spanish "mundialización"to the more common Anglo-Saxon"globalisation" which is ambivalent, in that "global" means both "total" and "world-wide").

The ambiguity of the word contributes to the lack of clarity. It is a diffuse and ambiguous term which is often used loosely. It is used in an economic sense to mean integration of markets, but at the same time it is used with reference to the cultural sphere, as though to suggest that nowadays there are cultural expressions which have a "total" and "world-wide" dimension. It seems to me necessary, therefore, to begin by trying to clarify some of the senses in which the concept of "globalisation" is used today, before going on to examine its mythical character. Lastly, we shall reflect a little on some of the theological challenges this raises.

I. The meanings of "globalisation"

1. A historical process: The fact of globalisation is understood as one stage in the process of developing a world economic system (F. Braudel). It denotes the existence of an amalgam of scientific knowledge applied in the field of human techniques in accordance with political, economic and/or cultural intentions. This combination of diverse elements enabled certain political and economic interests to begin to construct a world market. Starting from an economic and political centre they began to form a network of mercantile relations. The centre established contacts with certain peripheral points (i.e. situated outside its direct geographical sphere of influence), through which it could then establish further contacts with more distant points on the periphery, thereby building an economic system possessing a permanent structure (a network organised from a centre of power to which peripheries and semi-peripheries are linked). The system is governed from the centre for the benefit of its own interests, and converges from the periphery towards the centre, the place where it has its heart and where wealth is principally accumulated. This process, which started in the early 16th century, made it possible to build up a permanent structure, albeit with a changing morphology. Since the beginning of the modern era, the evolution of the economic process can, therefore, be understood as the development of a system which always possesses a centre and peripheries. The centres of the system have changed, but the centre-periphery relation has endured. This process corresponds to the capitalist system, which is characterised by the accumulation of private wealth.

Throughout this process, scientific and technological development play a very important role, so at this point it seems necessary to discuss the interests and motives that direct and promote this development. Since it has a scientific dimension, some people think that one of the reasons behind this process is the "quest for truth". Others believe this evolution can be explained by the desire of many human beings for a better life. Yet others maintain that the real driving force behind this process is the hunger for power which benefits those who possess it and enables them to subjugate others. This discussion raises the whole question of "the neutrality of knowledge and of science".

Take, for example, the motives for using gunpowder. Something which for the inhabitants of the East of Asia served chiefly to make fireworks for amusement during festivities, began to be used in western Europe for purposes of war. This in turn contributed to the development of the physical sciences. We may say, therefore, that among the things to be taken into account in the development of knowledge, is the will for supremacy and domination. Reflecting on the directions of culture towards the end of the 50s of the century that is now ending, Jean-Paul Sartre pointed out that more than half the resources invested in academic research projects had to do directly or indirectly with military activities ("Où va la culture de notre temps?" in Les Temps Modernes. Paris, 1958). Those who have the means to use this knowledge and apply it at the level of technology have a power which the rest of us cannot have. Scientific knowledge and power are linked.

In the building of a world economy system supremacy enjoyed for a time by certain central powers (e.g. Holland from 1600-1740; Great Britain from 1750-1890; the USA from 1900 up to the present) was due principally to their scientific and technological advantage. To a large extent this power was deliberately cultivated. It was not a by-product of the search for truth for truth's sake. The political, economic and cultural power it generated was expressed through different forms of colonialism, all of which in one way or another translated the relation between a dominant central metropolis and subordinate peripheries.

In the world-economy system of today, the supremacy is in the hands of the United States. This power is exercised not only in the military sphere but also in the economic field and in international political relations. It can also be seen in the fascination the culture of the United States exerts upon the majority of the world's population. Some of the symbols of this culture – Coca-Cola, McDonald's, CNN, etc. – have a "global" significance, and perhaps the most powerful of all at the "global" level is the dollar, the currency of the USA. These comments concern the world economic system as it has developed thus far. The process is not closed, but it is safe to say that the system seems strong enough to weather violent crises without being changed. It may undergo some internal changes, but there seems no prospect of its basic structure (dominant centre/subordinate peripheries) ever being much different from what it is.

2. The availability of new information technologies has brought about important changes in the way human beings relate to the world in which they live, which brings us to a second sense of the term "globalisation". This is the definition propounded chiefly by economists and liberal social scientists (including, of course, those who may be called "neo-liberals"). For all these people, globalisation is economic in character and is seen first and foremost in the integration of markets, notably the financial market. There is no denying the reality of this. We are witnessing a situation world-wide where the same money is put to work several times in the course of the same day through the possibilities offered by the technological innovations introduced into everyday life over recent decades. In the majority of cases these are international transactions. Other markets operate in the same way, but it is the financial market which has the highest level of globalisation. It should be noted, however, that there are specific important markets which are not integrated and indeed are notably different in world terms. One of these is the labour market, where workers employed in the same branch of production, doing practically the same job but in different parts of the world, are treated differently when it comes to recompensing the value of their labour. Facts of this kind show that, in reality, globalisation is not as "global" (world-wide) as some would have us believe. Some sectors of international production are integrated, while others are highly differentiated.

In the light of the foregoing comments, other features of this process may be mentioned. First, at the risk of repeating myself, we are dealing with a specific moment in the evolution of capitalism. On this point, it is worth recalling the text written by Helmuth Gollwitzer in September 1973 for a book published under the title "The Capitalist Revolution". Its main theses were written in the days following the military coup d'état against the socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. Gollwitzer's position in this text is clear: the revolution propelled by the capitalist process (to which Marx and Engels also refer in the first part of the Communist Manifesto, 1848) is not yet completed. Whereas, in a first phase, the predominant interests were those of what may, for the sake of analysis, be called "agricultural export capital", while in its second phase -starting with the industrial revolution -those of industrial capital prevailed, the situation began to change during the second half of this century. For the past forty years the capitalist process has been run by financial capital – a more impersonal, almost anonymous, highly competitive and speculative type of capital, for which risk is more important than prudence; capital that has a strong tendency to form oligopolies and is constantly on the look-out for mergers and conglomerates.

Second, during the transition from predominantly industrial to predominantly financial capital a very significant change has taken place : the value of work has changed. At the end of this century, the accepted meaning of work is no longer the same as it was thirty years ago. This change has affected employers, who now demand highly skilled and qualified workers, but also the workers, many of whom consider that employment (as a means of subsistence and an expression of social status) is more important than work (a professional occupation reflecting a vocation and personal identity). For many, in both North and South, the need for employment is more urgently felt than the need to have meaningful work that satisfies their professional conscience. In our contemporary societies the struggle to find and keep employment is very exacting.

Third, in consequence of the above, the ties of solidarity among workers are being weakened. The introduction of new information technologies ("robotisation"), requiring specialised training to handle them, is fostering individualism among workers. Durkheim pointed out in his book "The Division of Labour in Society" that, while in so-called traditional societies, the practice of solidarity is mechanical and automatic, in industrial societies it has to be organic and conscious to ensure the necessary complementarity between the different social actors and in the production process. In post-industrial societies, which have become mass societies, the priority is not complementarity; the most important thing is integration. But in order to be successfully integrated you have to prove yourself to be competent and competitive. Those who do not achieve an acceptable level of skills are shut out. So we have "exclusion", a phenomenon which can be understood as a consequence of the weakening of the ties of solidarity. It is not surprising that those who are marginalised by this process, which integrates only those who are able to compete, are the people who cannot pay the price demanded by competitivity. As a result, new unjust and shocking social differences are being created.

3. In the course of this century human beings invented an artefact which, for at least thirty or forty years, helped effectively to offset the effects of the processes of social differentiation. This was the Welfare State, which was undeniably instrumental in creating better living conditions in the period following the end of the Second World War (1945 -1975). Those who advocate the integration of markets (= globalisation) demand more opportunities for markets to integrate and want to see the influence and power of the State reduced. "More market -less government" seems to be the order of the day. The "State vs. Market" polemic was timidly relaunched in June last year when Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder published the paper Europe: the third way -die neue Mitte, which has produced a chain reaction among liberals and neo-liberals. The latter defend the imperative of the "private market" as essential to the process of "globalisation" (cf. for example, Milton Friedman, in an article published in El País, Madrid on 11/7/99, with the title "No hay una Tercera Via al Mercado" [There is no third way to the market]. Another, by Rolf Dahrendorf , La Tercera Via [The Third Way], affirmed that freedom must be defended (who would disagree!) , which is more feasible on the "global" than on the national scale. Cf. El País, 11/7/1999. Dahrendorf states that the internationalisation (not, he says, to be confused with "globalisation") of decisions and activities almost invariably means a loss of democracy. Friedman suggests in his article that political mechanisms are much less effective than the mechanisms of the free market when it comes to driving dynamic change and producing growth and prosperity. There aren't many rules for overcoming the tyranny of the established order ( for which read "political mechanisms"), but one of them is clear: if a state activity is to be privatised or eliminated, it has to be done totally.

Most analysts of the process of globalisation emphasise one point, although some who maintain that the process is necessary have nothing to say on this particular aspect: the result of "less State", or the suppression of the regulatory role of the State in socio-economic life, is to accentuate the social inequalities produced by market mechanisms. Once again we see the face of capitalism which cannot exist without the poor. The corresponding appropriation of wealth requires a significant proportion of the population to be poor. If any attempt is made to reduce the proportion of poor people in society, as the Welfare State tried to do, it inevitably means imposing limits on market forces. The latter, needless to say, defend their free spaces ("free market", "free enterprise") tooth and nail. The thing that counts for them is saving what, from their point of view, is the only system capable of guaranteeing the creation of wealth. From this standpoint, economic management rhymes with "freedom of the market" rather than with "social justice". "Globalisation" therefore requires that the role of regulating economic life be fulfilled not by the State, but by the market – that is, by the agents operating in it. "Globalising" means reducing the importance of the political process, subordinating political mechanisms to the demands of the market. Friedman, in the article already mentioned, puts it like this: "For the third way to be useful, it will have to focus on ways of overcoming the political obstacles to the expansion of the market." Globalising thus also means privatising, curtailing the public space, amputating the res publica.

4. A Uruguayan theologian whom I greatly admire and to whom I owe a great deal, is Juan Luis Segundo. I regret to say he passed away some three years ago. In his book Fe e Ideología (Faith and Ideology. Madrid, Cristiandad, 1982), he reflects on the fact that for human (theological or anthropological) beliefs to become operative they have to be accompanied and sustained by theories that utilise elements of reality so that the visions of the faith can become concrete in human lives. He says that just as "faith without works is dead" (repeating the phrase from the Epistle of James), so faith without ideologies is inoperative.

Capitalism was developed for the purpose of obtaining wealth and power and the process created by the intention to achieve this goal is based on unquestioned beliefs. We need mention only one of them: "the invisible hand" of the market alluded to by John Adam Smith in both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations. This belief suggests that the agent participating in the market does so primarily in order to satisfy his own self-interest, knowing that others are doing the same and seeking maximum profits. The belief that there exists in the market a providential mechanism which creates complementarity between diverse and even conflicting interests fosters the formation of competitive calculations, conjectures and suppositions which promote aggressive initiatives and enterprises. Belief in the invisible hand contributes to the operation of the market. This belief is an expression of ideological imagination.

In this age of "globalisation" faith in the power of the "invisible hand" of the market is nourished by the ideological (because not absolutely certain) affirmation that, as Friedman suggests, "there is no other way for the future than to be integrated into 'the' world market". The same has been asserted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ever since it was founded in 1994 to continue the work started by the GATT in 1948. If there is no other way, all other propositions are invalid. The global market has a tendency to escape regulation and control by national political mechanisms. It is the space where market players have the greatest freedom of action. In their own interests they consider it essential that the same freedom should be possible at national level, where the order imposed by political mechanisms places limits on economic interests, which is why, as we have seen, they are calling for a reduction in the power of the State. They want this tendency to be given free rein everywhere. In other words, a single, global economic system should be established in the same way throughout the world. Those who advocate the way of the free and global market consider it as the only path to follow if we are to shape the best possible future for human societies.

This single way is imposing a single culture in a world that has until now been marked by cultural diversity. The growing pervasiveness of market reasoning is fuelling the development of a competitive consumer society which represents a threat to, and indeed a frontal attack on, communities living in cultures where solidarity is practised automatically, mechanically. This clash provokes many of those aggressed to react in defence of their of identity, and they assert themselves by affirming their traditions and values. Nevertheless, there are many – and the number is growing – who acknowledge that the gravitational pull of the culture of the global market, presented as the only acceptable way of thinking is very strong. This type of cultural relationship leads to the emergence of hybrid cultures which are inevitably caught in the dilemma of operating according to the demands of the global market, while at the same time trying to maintain the traditions and values which are threatened by the market - though the latter does also tolerate and subordinate these.

The coexistence of cultures in societies where this hybridisation has taken place does not mean that there is dialogue between them. In fact there is one dominant culture and others which are subordinate. The global culture imposes its norms in the economic field and tries to do so in the political field. However, the subordinate cultures also have their impact on other areas of social life: their traditional forms of behaviour are finding their way into modern societies. A mixture of social responsibility and involvement in the market has spread through our societies. People have come to be both "consumers and citizens", albeit not always to the same degree (cf. Néstor García Canclini, Consumidores y Cidudanos. Mexico, Ed. Grijalbo, 1995). This is to say, in fact, that the "one way of thinking" is not global, though it tries to impose itself as such.

It has succeeded in doing so in the economic-financial sphere, though meeting with great resistance. This is where the ideological component of globalisation can be seen most clearly. Globalisation in itself, as a process, is not in fact directed towards imposing a single line of thinking. It is important to be clear about this: the direction in which the process of globalisation is being steered is due primarily to the neo-liberal ideology which has dominated economic thinking over the past 25 years. The main problem is not globalisation as such. The underlying elements which have made it possible (the development of science and technology during the past three centuries) have both positive and negative elements. But globalisation in recent decades has been driven by economic neo-liberalism, with the result that the goal of the process has become the creation and appropriation of private wealth at all costs, even if it means sacrificing social cohesion and the well-being of broad sectors of our societies.

To summarise, "globalisation" is the present phase in the process of constructing a world economic system aimed at the integration of markets (which is not total, because there are markets that have not been integrated). The people steering this process urge the need for a reduction in the powers of the State, above all they want to deprive it of the prerogatives attributed to the Welfare State in regard to economic activity. Ideologically, this process has been oriented over the past 25 to 30 years by the proponents of economic neo-liberalism. However, the scope of this process is tending to go beyond the economic field. It has formulated a cultural proposition, presenting itself as the "only acceptable way of thinking", an expression of the dominant culture to which all other cultures are to be subordinated. The latter resist and the result is processes of cultural hybridisation, which enables them to survive at least in part, while conceding some space to the one frame of thought.

II. Is globalisation a myth?

One difficulty immediately arises when it comes to answering this question – the human sciences are not agreed on the meaning of myth. First, under the influence of modern positivist thinking, "myth" came to be widely understood as an imaginary, fictitious tale, often in poetic form. In this understanding a "myth" is a fantasy, an invention of the mind belonging to the world of fiction. Since it does not correspond to material reality, something "mythical" is regarded as false. Moreover, the fact that many beliefs (religious and other) are expressed in myths has caused such accounts to be associated with superstition (that is, a state of mind that believes that certain actions, or words or numbers or positions will bring good luck or bad luck, happiness or misfortune). The commonly accepted understanding of myth in modern societies is of a fictitious statement or story, something that is untrue.

We should not forget, however, that in the history of thought, myth has frequently been used in an attempt to explain complicated aspects of reality that cannot be clarified by logical, strictly rational discourse. Recourse to myth means that poetical, metaphorical, symbolic language is used and that, despite its multiple levels of meaning, it is more effective than logical discourse in throwing light on the meaning of realities that escape the confines of reason. Use of myth belongs in the sphere of thinking where, according to Pascal, l'esprit de finesse should predominate, as opposed to l'esprit de géométrie. This helps us to understand why Plato, in some of his Dialogues, resorted to mythical explanations. Similarly, many centuries later, Goethe too used them to explain intricate aspects of the modern being (e.g. Faust; The Sorcerer's Apprentice). These are fantastic narratives which throw light on real aspects of human existence, be it social or personal.

It is important to note that myths are recounted through narratives which combine elements of reality and elements of fiction. The real elements used in myths are detached from their structural relation with other elements of reality. Thus isolated from the whole context of real things, they are artificially put together with products of the imagination in a poetic construction which enables people to make sense of reality. In this way, the myth attempts to explain elements of human experience which seem to have no place in a logical explanation of reality, yet we know from experience that absurd, illogical experiences recur in our existence. Scientific knowledge is not always able to penetrate the irrational opacity of these processes and events. The poetic account, on the other hand, can make them understandable. The myth helps to make sense of things when logical reason (l'esprit de géométrie) proves helpless to do so.

In this context, and pursuing this line of thinking, I believe the metaphor used by Claude Lévi-Strauss in several of his works (cf. Le Cru et le Cuit; Anthropologie Structurelle, etc.), describing the myth as a "machine for suspending time", is valid. By this the French anthropologist suggested that a myth allows those who adhere to it to suspend their historicity. Effectively, a single, concrete moment in the history of a living being is incorporated into cyclical, recurring time ("the eternal recurrence of the same", referred to by Nietzsche), structured by archetypal situations, constantly reproduced. To logical reason this is absurd (for "history does not repeat itself"). Nevertheless, human existence is again and again confronted by such forms and structures of reality.

The ordering and re-ordering of myths (which Lévi-Strauss compares to executing "variations on a theme") leads to the construction of systems of social representation which claim the authority inherent in a natural event. It should be noted that these refer to a real event: the repetition of events which leave human beings perplexed. These happenings, isolated from processes and structures (both likewise constructs of the human mind) are amalgamated with narratives or explanations that make sense in a way that science cannot do satisfactorily. In executing these "variations on a theme" the explanatory interpretation in the myth is as mythical as the myth itself. Or, as has been pointed out often enough, the explanation and interpretation of the Oedipus myth given by Freud are as mythical as the narrative used by Sophocles in writing his tragedies.

The myth possesses a different force from scientific explanation as understood in modern culture. Science is a body of knowledge and research showing a sufficient degree of unity, coherence and general application to allow the men and women engaged in developing such knowledge and research to arrive at concurring conclusions which are neither the result of arbitrary conventions nor of personal interests and tastes, but of objective relations gradually uncovered and verified and confirmed by clearly defined methods. The sciences study concrete facts in order to understand the laws by which they are governed. The originality of the myth , as a "machine for suppressing time" (which the sciences neither can nor want to do) lies in their capacity to relate simultaneously to the past, the present and the future. This is a double structure: it is historical, because it is actual; and at the same time it is anti-historical because it repeats itself. There are historical facts which, on being turned into narratives, are gradually transformed into myths. This is the case of Michelet's studies on the French Revolution, which present it in such a way that its structure has come to be a paradigm for modern revolutions.

To recapitulate: first, in a myth we have a narrative which is compatible with real events but which is combined and amalgamated with fictional elements. In this sense, a myth is a legend. It may be the inspiration for other works of art (painting, music, drama, sculpture, etc ). The basic structure of the myth is expressed in the language in which it is communicated. This is where the duality of the myth comes in: while it invokes real events and experiences of men and women, who again and again turn to myth to produce meaning in the midst of meaningless situations, it also enables them to escape the limitation of facts, because by way of the myth they can protest against the idea that anything can be meaningless, with which the sciences compromise. In this way, myths may be liberating.

Second, a myth is poetic. That is, it contributes to the "revelation of being" (Heidegger). So we may say that although myths make use of fiction they also transcend it, since fiction conceals being. The metaphorical, symbolic language of myth, on the other hand, replaces one image with another. Both images are acceptable when they are homologous with the object to which they refer. Images and metaphors produced in sequence in a poetic narration enable imaginative knowledge to unfold, which not only reaches to the threshold of being but also gives a glimpse of new dimensions of reality (which generally escape the "esprit de géométrie" ). Sometimes a change in circumstances is enough for the illuminating power of myths to let us see new aspects of reality. This is what has caused hermeneuticists to speak of the reserve of meaning of mythical texts. All this in relation to the poetic nature of mythical thinking.

Third, a myth is symbolic. Or perhaps, synthetical. It combines and condenses various features in its narrative, not just because its structure combines a real happening and fiction, reality and fantasy, the contingent and the permanent, but also because it binds events, structures and values closely together. Study of the symbolism of myth shows that there is more to it than a narrative; the myth is also normative : it not only gives meaning to what has happened, but points towards what should be and offers itself as a norm for action.

Four, as has been noted above, the commonly prevailing understanding is that a mythical story is a fabulation and a subversion of the historical truth.

This brief overview of the difficulties surrounding a definition of the notion of myth, brings me back to the question I raised at the start of the second part of this presentation. As I pointed out in outlining the different meanings given to the concept of globalisation today, there is no specifically poetical account attempting to explain it. The integration of markets world-wide, and the development of advanced information technologies on which it is based, are seemingly incontrovertible facts. True, when the mass use of the new communication media started a few decades ago, various metaphors were forged in an attempt to convey the new reality. One of these was "the global village", coined by McLuhan. However, no widely accepted narrative has been constructed around this metaphor, so I think it is fair to say that, for the moment, this transposition of terms does not have a mythical dimension.

Referring to globalisation I mentioned the importance of economic neo-liberalism as the ideology behind the integration of markets. This is a doctrine which has acquired the status of dogma (cf. Maurice Allais, La crise mondiale d'aujourd'hui, Paris, Ed Clément Jaguar, 1999). The vast majority of contemporary economists pay service to the premises of this school of thinking which has produced a situation where the players involved in financial markets are essentially beyond control. The dogma states that a free market for free enterprise is the best possible economic system for creating and accumulating private wealth. At present the proponents of this dogma who are seeking to impose it urbi et orbi are the same people who insist on the necessity of accepting of globalisation along the lines demanded by neo-liberals.

Classical economic liberalism, and the contemporary neo-liberalism which is trying to follow the same path, refer to certain basic texts. One of the best known of these is by Mandeville, "The Fable of the Bees" and another is the essay by the Rev. Thomas Malthus, "On Population". But none of these is as important as the passage from Book IV of "The Wealth of Nations" by John Adam Smith, where -as I have already said – the author refers to the "invisible hand" coordinating the competing interests of the market.

Is this a mythical text? In part, yes. It is partly narrative, using metaphorical and hence poetic language. Nevertheless, again basing myself on the thinking of Lévi-Strauss, I believe we are dealing with a bricolage, a basically ideological construct of the human mind as it grapples to understand the growing complexities of modern economic life, which are experienced in much the same way as in the early days of the industrial revolution. For Lévi-Strauss a bricolage is an intellectual, not a scientific construct which "on the practical plane elaborates structured sets, not directly with other structured sets, but using odds and ends (bribes et morceaux) of events, fossilised testimonies of the history of an individual or a society" (La Pensée Sauvage. Paris, Plon, 1962, p. 32). The person who produces a bricolage builds structures with bits and pieces of events, using "second hand" material, unlike the scientist who gradually creates his means as he develops his project, building up knowledge.

The text in which Adam Smith talks about "the invisible hand" is a good example of bricolage. In the general framework of a deistic and mechanistic Weltanschauung (the remains of the thinking prevailing in Adam Smith's home country, Scotland, in the first part of the 18th century); accepting the importance of self-interest in human behaviour, especially among economic actors (another oddment, in this case retained from Hobbes); taking account of the incipient development of the modern international market, though isolating it from the wider historical process in which economy, politics, society and culture establish dialectic relations between structures and values (development of western imperialism, a process which has been analysed recently by historians like I. Wallerstein or E. Hobsbawm), Adam Smith amalgamates (bricole) these bits and pieces in an artificial and, up to a point, arbitrary way, invoking the magical force of the "invisible hand" to give a veneer of structural coherence to his choice of free enterprise in a "free market". Since the latter part of the 18th century up to the present time this (undeniably fictional) text has been a dogma of economic thinking of the liberal school.

The notion of bricolage, though admittedly close to mythical thinking, nevertheless belongs much more to ideology than to mythology. This is not a pre-scientific way of thinking, but an a-scientific one, which can in some cases display great ingenuity. Intellectual bricolage tries to make sense of something which defies rigorous investigation, and in producing meaning in this way it seeks to be operational and effective. Seen in this way, bricolage is much more an ideological than a mythical construction (though they are, let me stress again, undeniably close). However, it does not concern itself with the starting point of knowledge, it does not question it, nor does it bother to verify the viability of its proposition (its impact). It is chiefly interested in the meaning it produces and its immediate effectiveness. Liberal economic thinking, like contemporary neo-liberalism, from Adam Smith up to the present day, has maintained this ideological position.

Consequently, reflecting on globalisation, we will find that this ideological characteristic (this a-scientific bricolage) persists, as Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann have clearly demonstrated (cf. Die Globalisierungsfalle. Der Angriff auf Demokratie und Wohlstand. Reimbek bei Hamburg, Romwohlt Verlag GmbH, 1996). It is a mode of thinking close to myth, but it offers no vision other than that of adjusting to this process. This is due to the a-scientific nature of the thinking of those who postulate the neo-liberal ideology driving the process of globalisation: it takes account only of some odds and ends of reality (those that are of interest to financial capital), but it pays no attention to the wider impact of neo-liberal practice at world level. This has made itself felt in a succession of financial crises, one more severe than the other. Mexico, Japan, Russia, South East Asia, South Korea, Russia again, Brazil....to mention only those that have occurred since the end of 1994. Where will be next? All this bearing in mind two facts which I consider to be fundamental: one, as Maurice Allais mentions in the book cited above, more money is granted in loans than is held in reserves in banks and national treasuries; and two, as NGOs have often complained, the money invested daily on stock exchanges and in international transactions, etc. largely exceeds the real money that exists in the world. This money clearly reflects the existence of speculative practices which are not based principally on objective, material realities, but on subjective calculations.

While globalisation has no other vision to offer for the future but that of adjusting to the rationality of its irrationality (Hinkelammert), there is a different, wider and more inclusive vision that insists on the need to correct and redirect the economic process. This reorientation, and the practice that goes with it, will form the framework for a number of theological questions which I shall examine in the section that follows.

III. Theological challenges

To speak of "theology" in the singular is to generalise unduly, for what in fact exists are theologies. Not only because there are different religions, but also because within each of them there are different lines of theological reflection, some complementary and some in tension. There are conflicting interpretations of the content of the faith confessed by communities of believers. The position I shall try to convey reflects my personal situation, as someone who comes from South America, more specifically from the Rio de la Plata region (very Europeanised, secular, open to modernity), but who has lived for many years in Western Europe. I shall mention three challenges that concern me particularly, while recognising that there are others.

1. Speaking the Word. The information technologies which are so crucial in sustaining the process of globalisation, have introduced into the daily lives of hundreds of millions of human beings forms of virtual communication which are tending to standardise our languages. Furthermore – and this seems to me a very serious point – a clear distinction is developing between those who have access to such technologies and others who do not have this opportunity. While, in principle, these technologies can be used by everyone, in fact, this theoretical equality is not confirmed in reality. The people who actually have the opportunity to use such technologies have at their disposal a mass of information that enables them to compete more effectively on the market. The others are left outside unless they are able to make enormous efforts and pay a very high price.

What I would like to emphasise is that the progressive standardisation of our languages as a result of the increasing use of the new virtual communication media is leading to the banalising of speech. Through turns of phrase and linguistic codes that are becoming universal, even the harshest realities of human experience are de-dramatised. Likewise, the motives for happiness and rejoicing are not easy to communicate; they are not infectious. Situations which were full of meaning for those involved appear dull when they appear in the information media. The trivialisation of meaning is a feature of the new situation. This goes some way towards explaining the hunger for meaning manifested by the men and women of our times, who have shown an assiduity in the practice of religion which has surprised those who, a few years ago, were predicting the unstoppable advance of secularisation.

In this context, people who want to communicate the motives that make them keep struggling and persevering in their efforts have no other resort but to break out of the norms of this banalising language, and are often driven to put their message across using shock tactics. I have seen this time and again in Latin America, chiefly among social groups marginalised by the information media, such as the peasants fighting for land to work so that they can maintain their dignity as people of the soil. There is no other possibility open to them than to take action -generally violent and vigorous – outside the legal norms, which broad sections of public opinion find shocking. But this is the only way they have to make their presence felt in the sphere of communications. It is like a cri de coeur that lets them be heard when most other ways of communicating are closed to them.

When the communications media choose to ignore what is happening, it is as though certain processes and events, however significant, had never taken place. True, the media do inform. But their selection of information amounts to an implicit censorship of what is reported. Consequently, those who feel they have something important to communicate use shocking or sometimes extravagant methods to attract attention and at least get noticed. The important thing for them is to make their presence felt in the sphere of the information media. To succeed in doing so is to affirm their existence; not to be taken into account by those media is tantamount to not existing.

The context which I have tried briefly to outline poses a very serious problem for theological work. This happens in concrete terms when the Word of God is spoken, as in a testimony bearing witness to the gospel, a Sunday sermon faithful to the biblical memory, a liturgical celebration that transforms the mystery of the faith into a real presence. The vocation of the theologian is to speak the Word of God. When the Word is spoken, the incarnation of the Logos is realised anew. This is an actual manifestation that for some people permits communication of spirits: the Spirit of God in his freedom enters into dialogue and relationship with the spirits of human beings. "Speaking the Word" summons people to faith, and moves hearts to act concretely (and not just to believe).

Speaking the Word means putting it across in concrete terms. The incarnation of the Logos took place through the unique existence of Jesus of Nazareth, in a Palestine dominated by the Roman Empire. In the midst of the uniformity that the Latin colonisers sought to impose throughout the length and breadth of the world they had conquered, Jesus of Nazareth was able to communicate his gospel to the group of disciples who followed him. Occasionally, the multitudes (or the masses, as we would say nowadays) also glimpsed the density of his being. They recognised him as a prophet, while his disciples saw him as God's Messiah, the Christ. He succeeded in speaking the Word, as did the apostles and other witnesses throughout history. They did this by giving the Word concrete, palpable, meaningful content in situations which were always unique. To put this in the terms of this presentation: the Word was spoken not globally, but concretely.

The challenge that faces contemporary Christian theological work is how to speak the Word when language is being banalised in the way I spoke of earlier. It is not a matter of repeating ready-made words and phrases, but of giving real, substantial meaning to the Word of God so that it does not get lost in the babble of human messages. I do not go so far as to say that the virtual languages of the information media can be compared to what the people who dominated society at the time of the building of the Tower of Babel sought to do by imposing a single language on everyone when they built the tower. Some people make this comparison, but I have no wish to draw such parallels. What concerns me is the concrete fact of the banalising of language, as a result of which the Word of God is lost in the welter of trivialities that are "communicated" in this day and age.

In this context, and trying to respond to the challenge, let me mention three things. First, the biblical Word surprises us with its realism. When we try to understand the world of the Old Testament, or the accounts of the gospels and the Acts of the Apostles (even, despite its cryptic and allegorical style, the Book of Revelation), we are amazed at the concrete, physical nature of these narratives (even in texts which are charged with "spiritual" content). These are not stories where God intervenes in magical fashion, like an "invisible hand", solving the problems created by human beings but totally extraneous to them. When God speaks and acts he does so in the midst of men and women. God takes part in the story. God is not a supernatural adjunct to it.

Second, God puts an end to the inertia of the "common sense" that weighs so much in human relations. His Word shocks, but it is not foolish or beside the point. It involves acts or messages which leave people wondering and surprised (e.g. It was said of Jesus, "This man speaks with authority and not like the scribes"), and which are generally unexpected. "Speaking the Word" is similar to the cri de coeur which those who have no place in the world of virtual communications are forced to launch in order to make themselves heard. It is in the nature of an act, but it is not an act of desperation. Rather, it is determined, firm and charged with hope (although, as happened to Jesus when he finally decided to go to Jerusalem) it may lead to the cross itself.

Third, "speaking the Word" means talking about what really exists though it is often obscured by appearances. The reality of the world in which we live is opaque. Beneath its glittering exterior the process of globalisation hides misery and misfortune on a vast scale. It also conceals many iniquities and much irresponsibility. We have already spoken of its speculative nature, of its impact which weakens the links of solidarity among human beings. These problems head what would have to be a very long list if it were to be exhaustive. The advocates and proponents of globalisation do not mention these things. They try to throw a veil over them. By contrast, the Word of God states what underlies reality, while at the same time highlighting the equivocal and fraudulent character of the message which refers only to the outer skin of things. As the Letter to the Hebrews tells us, "Indeed the Word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing until it divides soul from spirit, joints from marrow; it is able to judge the thoughts and intentions of the heart. And before him no creature is hidden, but all are naked and laid bare to the eyes of the one to who we must render an account" (Heb. 4:12-13).

I believe that theology today cannot ignore this challenge of speaking the true word which surprises and throws light on the things that are below the surface. Our faithfulness to God that is at stake in this.

2. Doing justice. Jesus' words to the disciples are clear: "Strive first for the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things (food, clothing, reassurance, etc) will be given to you as well" (Mt. 6:33). The kingdom of God means practising God's justice. This is a fundamental, primordial tenet of Christian theology.

Comparing the content of human discourse of twenty years ago with the ideas expressed nowadays one is struck by the contrast in relation to the term justice. From 1930 to 1980, justice was unquestionably a focus of public attention and discussion. Most people were conscious of the challenge of a fairer society. It was a matter of justice in national societies, where the welfare state represented an attempt to administer public life, but also of justice between rich and poor nations, between the developed and the under-developed world, for which the goal of economic development on more or less equitable terms was set by the United Nations Organisation; justice between different ethnic groups in the world which prompted (as it still does) the fight against racism; and justice in gender relations, promoting the inherent dignity of women. Justice which means making a concrete attempt to correct iniquitous economic and social differences.

Nowadays, the question of justice has gradually faded into the background. The injustices we experience as we reach the end of this century are certainly greater than those that existed in various areas of our human societies three or four decades ago. Yet a heavy silence lies over this issue, as though the weakening of the social movements which traditionally fought for justice had somehow diluted concern for it.

This situation is paradoxical. Paul Ricoeur, commenting on the book by John Rawls Theory of Justice, rightly notes that we human beings become conscious of the need for justice when we are subjected to situations of injustice (cf. Ecrits: Autour du Politique. Paris, Ed. Du Seuil, 1991). The paradox lies in the fact that we are aware that there is more injustice today than there was thirty years ago: the dismantling of the welfare state and the mechanisms it had created to protect the lives of the less privileged sectors of society; the growth of social inequalities as a result of economic measures, neo-liberal deregulation and adjustment policies; the consequences of a series of financial crises in a system which proclaims itself "global", but where the crises always affect the poorest while the rich grow stronger (the list of injustices is very long) – all these are undeniable facts. Yet the need for greater justice is not being pursued with the same forcefulness as it was 15 or 20 years ago.

Where do the reasons for this silence lie? On the one hand, there is the feeling that there is no alternative to the prevailing global order. This poses a clear challenge for Christian theology which emphasises the virtue of hope; hope that things will be transformed, that death and its sorrows are not history's last word. Or, to put it another way, that injustice shall not prevail. This sense of having no alternatives (TINA -There Is No Alternative) has spread a mood of scepticism. Worse still, the people who should be motivated to fight for social change leading to greater justice have auto-censored themselves and allowed themselves to become paralysed. In this context, the theologian is challenged to "speak the word" spoken by Jesus to the paralytic, "Take up your bed and walk".

On the other hand, this silence expresses a fear, the fear of saying or doing things that are not in line with the opinions diffused by the global centres of communication. These keep repeating "TINA, TINA" and the bulk of public opinion joins in the chorus. Even some of the new forms of Christianity in our times (chiefly on the peripheries, but also in North America and in parts of Europe) lend legitimacy to this cry which denies the existence of alternatives, by postulating a "theology of prosperity" upholding the rightness of seising every opportunity offered by the global market for generating and accumulating private wealth.

Injustice is not only social, it also affects the environment. Ecological movements condemn what is happening. True, there is some growth of awareness of the need to change our treatment of the environment with a view to shaping a sustainable society. Demagogic declarations aside, however, very few political or economic leaders have set on foot concrete measures to demonstrate environmental responsibility.

The challenge of justice posed for us concerns all dimensions of the inhabited earth. In this sense it is an ecumenical challenge. On the theological level this challenge is translated as how to highlight the urgency of the cause of justice in a world that ignores it, despite the growth of injustice. The Christian theologian cannot forget that the question of justice is at the very heart of the gospel. It constitutes the good news that establishing right and equitable human (personal and social) relations is profoundly willed by God (Rom. 12). The development of justice means that the leaven of the commandment to love God and our neighbour will ferment in human societies.

From the theological point of view, this means a change of direction for human beings and human societies. It therefore has to do with metanóia, with conversion. This refers not only to the "spiritual" dimension of human existence, it also includes its communal and social dimension. In the process of conversion, the moment of repentance is decisive, the moment when a person becomes aware of guilt and of the need to undergo radical transformation to give a new direction to his or her life.

I should like to end my comments on this point with a brief reference to the question of peace. While there is little mention of justice nowadays, we do hear a lot about peace – especially in relation to particular areas of the world such as the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and so on. Given the circumstances, this growth of awareness is both important and positive. But the theologian cannot disregard the biblical perception of peace as the fruit of justice – a justice which means that men and women can, in the context of existing conditions, attain the maturity and fullness of being necessary for peace. The Hebrew words sedeq and mishpat � righteousness/equity and justice point to the source of being, the very mystery of the life that springs from God and which is offered to human beings so that they may live aright, in peace, in shalom.

Writing this, I am aware that these affirmations can be accepted and shared in a Christian context. The challenge for the theologian is to reach beyond the boundaries of the community of faith so that believers of other confessions and other religions, and people who profess no religious faith, can hear and share the call for the practice of justice once again to be given due importance. If the first challenge consists in "speaking the Word", this second challenge points to the importance of "proclaiming the gospel" in a pertinent and meaningful way.

3. The challenge of grace. During 1999 the G7 countries decided to cancel the debt of the world's poorest countries. The grace offered them will amount to 70 million dollars. This is a positive response to the mobilisation that has been going on around this issue for a number of years and which has made itself felt at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 1994. It was also very strongly expressed at the UN World Conference on Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995, as well as being behind the Jubilee 2000 campaign which has won so much support from many different sectors of world opinion.

Despite the ambiguity of all things in history, this is a positive fact. But it does have a disquieting dimension, at least for a Protestant theologian. The remission of the debt is envisaged as an isolated act. It is not accompanied by efforts to transform the structures of international lending and trade (fundamental elements in the process of globalisation) which have generated such debts in the poorest countries (and in others classed as "developing", whose debts have not so far been "forgiven"). A very important fact is being ignored here : "forgiveness" of the debt is taking place after the debt has been paid. What has made things worse is payment of compound interest on the debt. Debt paid, debt accumulating compound interest, debt wiped out by a decision to afford "grace". This is a decision that shows condescension towards, but not solidarity with the people who have made huge sacrifices to meet the demands of debt so far.

The problem here is to know what "grace" are we talking about? The eradication of the debt will undoubtedly bring some relief in the lives of the populations of the poorest countries. But, it also represents a contribution to the global neo-liberal capitalist system itself. On the one hand, by bowing to the pressure of public opinion, it is able to present an image of flexibility to offset the unbending neo-liberal dogmatism for which it is often criticised. And on the other hand, the countries to which remission of debt is granted can thereafter become more dynamically involved in the "global" process of international trade (at least in the period immediately following this decision).

In a sense, what has been set in motion (with all the ambiguity inherent in all historical processes, let me repeat) is a mechanism for reciprocity – give and take, the expectation of something in return. This corresponds to the practice known as potlatch which is so well analysed by Marcel Mauss in his famous essay (Le Don, Paris).

Nevertheless, despite the elements of generosity present here, it is important to note that the reality which the Christian faith calls grace (charis) means something quite different. It translates the love of God offered unconditionally, once and for all, in the person of Jesus Christ of Nazareth. It is the love of God that sustains human life and calls us to live a life of gratitude expressed through love. Consequently, it requires us to transcend the limits inherent in the practice of reciprocity. Grace is given unconditionally; it expects nothing in return. We find a clear testimony to this in the prophecy of Hosea, in the relations established between the prophet, his wife who is a whore in the temple of Baal, and his children. This radical love is what Christian theology means by grace.

Confronted with practices that amount to partial "grace", the challenge for Christian theologians is to reassert the notion of charis. While being glad and giving thanks to God for what has been decided by the powers-that-be (a little is better than nothing), they will insist that grace is much more than that. The churches are also challenged to bear witness to this grace in their works and programmes.

But this immediately raises another question which takes this challenge further: Can grace redeem the market? Can it penetrate the market, redirect it, make it less competitive? Can it turn it once more into a "human artefact", responding to human beings rather than to its own self-regulating mechanisms? Or are we to believe that the market is a demonic part of reality beyond the reach of grace, one which we must therefore oppose with all our strength? In raising these questions I think of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, imprisoned by the Nazis, writing his Ethics and taking part in the group conspiring against Hitler. I regret that Bonhoeffer came to believe that the Nazi government was beyond redemption. Consequently action had to be taken against it, hence the tension that developed at that time between his political action and his theological thinking.

I believe we should not demonise the process of globalisation, for it actually provides opportunities for solidarity and support among the different peoples of the oikoumene. Or, to put it another way, the process of globalisation does contain seeds of grace that should not be overlooked. However, the neo-liberal orientation of the process calls for a radical change of course, and new legal instruments need to be gradually introduced to bring about this change of direction. One such instrument might be the procedure proposed by Prof. Tobin, winner of the Nobel Prise for Economics, who suggested imposing a tax of 0.1 per cent on international financial transactions, which would be used to establish a fund to promote development in the poor and developing countries -a proposal strongly opposed by the forces supporting the neo-liberal globalisation process. This initiative, like others under discussion, might form the basis for international financial and trade legislation (different from that pursued by the World Trade Organisation) leading to a positive reorientation of the international economic process.

Where is grace in all this? Just as grace is relatively present in the formulation of the Torah, so appropriate legislation can introduce some partial elements of liberation. It has been said that "the law also sets us free". What is at stake is to make freedom progress and prevent the spread of anarchy (which is the great risk emanating from the financial markets as they are organised at present).

Can the market "be redeemed"? Can grace (not potlatch) be re-established? For Saint Thomas Aquinas the main question was how to set the "just price". For John Calvin the essential thing was to affirm and consolidate the signs of human solidarity present in market mechanisms. Justice and solidarity -I believe the theologian's contribution to a response to the challenge lies in underlining the importance of these two elements, as the expression of grace.

Translated from the Spanish, Language Service, WCC